Hi
On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 5:33 PM, Thomas Hellstrom thellstrom@vmware.com wrote:
On 08/16/2013 03:19 PM, David Herrmann wrote:
Hi
On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 7:35 PM, Thomas Hellstrom thellstrom@vmware.com wrote:
(CC'ing the proper people since I'm still on parental leave).
On 08/13/2013 11:44 PM, David Herrmann wrote:
Please see inline comments.
Hi
On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 9:38 PM, David Herrmann dh.herrmann@gmail.com wrote:
Correctly allow and revoke buffer access on each open/close via the new VMA offset manager.
I haven't yet had time to check the access policies of the new VMA offset manager, but anything that is identical or stricter than the current vmwgfx verify_access() would be fine. If it's stricter however, we need to double-check backwards user-space compatibility.
My patches make vmw_dmabuf_alloc_ioctl() add the caller's open-file (file*) to the list of allowed users of the new bo. vmw_dmabuf_unref_ioctl() removes it again. I haven't seen any way to pass a user-dmabuf to another user so there is currently at most one user for a vmw_dmabuf. vmw_user_dmabuf_reference() looks like it is intended exactly for this case so it would have to add the file* of the caller to the list of allowed users. I will change that in v2. This means every user who gets a handle for the buffer (like gem_open) will be added to the allowed users. For TTM-object currently only a single user is allowed.
So I replace vmw_user_bo->base.tfile with a list (actually rbtree) of allowed files. So more than one user can have access. This, however, breaks the "shareable" attribute which I wasn't aware of. As far as I can see, "shareable" is only used by vmwgfx_surface.c and can be set by userspace to allow arbitrary processes to map this buffer (sounds like a security issue similar to gem flink). I actually think we can replace the "shareable" attribute with proper access-management in the vma-manager. But first I'd need to know whether "shareable = true" is actually used by vmwgfx user-space and how buffers are shared? Do you simply pass the mmap offset between processes? Or do you pass some handle?
Buffer- and surface sharing is done by passing an opaque (not mmap) handle. A process intending to map the shared buffer must obtain the map offset through a vmw_user_dmabuf_reference() call, and that only works if the buffer is "shareable".
Ugh? That's not true. At least in upstream vmwgfx vmw_user_dmabuf_reference() is unused. Maybe you have access to some newer codebase? Anyway, I can easily make this function call drm_vma_node_allow() and then newer vmwgfx additions will work just fine. This means, every user who calls vmw_user_dmabuf_reference() will then also be allowed to mmap that buffer. But users who do not own a handle (that is, they didn't call vmw_user_dmabuf_reference() or they dropped the reference via vmw_user_dmabuf_unref_ioctl()) will get -EACCES if they try to mmap the buffer.
This is an extension to how it currently works, so I doubt that it breaks any user-space. Is that fine for vmwgfx?
mmap offsets are never passed between processes, but valid only if obtained directly from the kernel driver.
Good to hear. That means this patch doesn't break any existing userspace.
This means that currently buffer mapping should have the same access restriction as the X server imposes on DRI clients; If a process is allowed to open the drm device, it also has map access to all "shareable" objects, which is a security hole in the sense that verify_access() should really check that the caller, if not the buffer owner, is also authenticated.
I actually don't care for DRI. This series tries to fix exactly that. I don't want that. Users with DRM access shouldn't be able to map arbitrary buffers. Instead, users should only be able to map buffers that they own a handle for. Access management for handles is an orthogonal problem that this series does not change. dma-buf does a pretty good job there, anyway.
The reason verify_access() is there is to make the TTM buffer object transparent to how it is exported to user space (GEM or TTM objects). Apparently the GEM TTM drivers have ignored this hook for some unknown reason.
I don't think that we need any extended access-management here. Why would we ever need different access-modes for mmap than for handles? This series reduces mmap() access-management to handle-access-management. That is, the right to mmap() a buffer is now bound to a buffer handle. If you don't own a handle, you cannot mmap the buffer. But if you own a handle, you're always allowed to mmap the buffer. I think this should be the policy to go for, or am I missing something?
That's also why I think verify_access() is not needed at all. Drivers shouldn't care for mmap() access, instead they should take care only privileged users get handles (whatever they do to guarantee that, gem-flink, dma-buf, ...).
Cheers David
Some ideas:
- Rather than having a list of allowable files on each buffer object,
perhaps we should have a user and a group and a set of permissions (for user, group and system) more like how files are handled?
- Rather than imposing a security policy in the vma manager, could we
perhaps have a set a utility functions that are called through verify_access(). Each driver could then have a wrapper to gather the needed information and hand it over to the VMA manager?
If you really pass mmap offsets in user-space and rely on this, I guess there is no way I can make vmwgfx use the vma-manager access management. I will have to find a way to work around it or move the "shareable" flag to ttm_bo.
We also need to make vmw_user_dmabuf_reference() correctly increase the vma-allow counter, but it is unused so remove it instead.
IIRC this function or a derivative thereof is used heavily in an upcoming version driver, so if possible, please add a corrected version rather than remove the (currently) unused code. This will trigger a merge error and the upcoming code can be more easily corrected.
I will do so.
Cc: Thomas Hellstrom thellstrom@vmware.com Signed-off-by: David Herrmann dh.herrmann@gmail.com
Just as a hint, this patch would allow to remove the "->access_verify()" callback in vmwgfx. No other driver uses it, afaik. I will try to add this in v2.
Regards David
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_resource.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_resource.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_resource.c index 0e67cf4..4d3f0ae 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_resource.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_resource.c @@ -499,6 +499,12 @@ int vmw_dmabuf_alloc_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, if (unlikely(ret != 0)) goto out_no_dmabuf;
ret = drm_vma_node_allow(&dma_buf->base.vma_node,file_priv->filp);
if (ret) {vmw_dmabuf_unreference(&dma_buf);goto out_no_dmabuf;}rep->handle = handle; rep->map_handle =drm_vma_node_offset_addr(&dma_buf->base.vma_node); rep->cur_gmr_id = handle; @@ -517,7 +523,18 @@ int vmw_dmabuf_unref_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, { struct drm_vmw_unref_dmabuf_arg *arg = (struct drm_vmw_unref_dmabuf_arg *)data;
struct ttm_object_file *tfile = vmw_fpriv(file_priv)->tfile;struct vmw_dma_buffer *dma_buf;int ret;ret = vmw_user_dmabuf_lookup(tfile, arg->handle, &dma_buf);if (ret)return -EINVAL;drm_vma_node_revoke(&dma_buf->base.vma_node, file_priv->filp);vmw_dmabuf_unreference(&dma_buf);/* FIXME: is this equivalent tovmw_dmabuf_unreference(dma_buf)? */
No. A ttm ref object is rather similar to a generic GEM object, only that it's generic in the sense that it is not restricted to buffers, and can make any desired object visible to user-space. So translated the below code removes a reference that the arg->handle holds on the "gem" object, potentially destroying the whole object in which the "gem" object is embedded.
So I actually need both lookups, vmw_user_dmabuf_lookup() and the lookup in ttm_ref_object_base_unref()? Ugh.. but ok, I will leave the function then as it is now but remove the comment.
Yes. This seems odd, but IIRC the lookups are from different hash tables. The unref() call makes a lookup in a hash table private to the file.
return ttm_ref_object_base_unref(vmw_fpriv(file_priv)->tfile, arg->handle, TTM_REF_USAGE);@@ -551,18 +568,6 @@ int vmw_user_dmabuf_lookup(struct ttm_object_file *tfile, return 0; }
-int vmw_user_dmabuf_reference(struct ttm_object_file *tfile,
struct vmw_dma_buffer *dma_buf)-{
struct vmw_user_dma_buffer *user_bo;if (dma_buf->base.destroy != vmw_user_dmabuf_destroy)return -EINVAL;user_bo = container_of(dma_buf, struct vmw_user_dma_buffer,dma);
return ttm_ref_object_add(tfile, &user_bo->base, TTM_REF_USAGE,NULL); -}
- /*
*/
- Stream management
-- 1.8.3.4
Otherwise looks OK to me.
Thanks! David