On 2021-02-08 12:49 p.m., Michel Dänzer wrote:
On 2021-02-05 9:53 p.m., Daniel Vetter wrote:
On Fri, Feb 5, 2021 at 7:37 PM Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
On Fri, Feb 05, 2021 at 04:37:52PM +0000, Chris Wilson wrote:
Userspace has discovered the functionality offered by SYS_kcmp and has started to depend upon it. In particular, Mesa uses SYS_kcmp for os_same_file_description() in order to identify when two fd (e.g. device or dmabuf) point to the same struct file. Since they depend on it for core functionality, lift SYS_kcmp out of the non-default CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE into the selectable syscall category.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson chris@chris-wilson.co.uk Cc: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski luto@amacapital.net Cc: Will Drewry wad@chromium.org Cc: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: Dave Airlie airlied@gmail.com Cc: Daniel Vetter daniel@ffwll.ch Cc: Lucas Stach l.stach@pengutronix.de
init/Kconfig | 11 +++++++++++ kernel/Makefile | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index b77c60f8b963..f62fca13ac5b 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -1194,6 +1194,7 @@ endif # NAMESPACES config CHECKPOINT_RESTORE bool "Checkpoint/restore support" select PROC_CHILDREN + select KCMP default n help Enables additional kernel features in a sake of checkpoint/restore. @@ -1737,6 +1738,16 @@ config ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_CALLBACKS config ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE bool
+config KCMP + bool "Enable kcmp() system call" if EXPERT + default y
I would expect this to be not default-y, especially if CHECKPOINT_RESTORE does a "select" on it.
This is a really powerful syscall, but it is bounded by ptrace access controls, and uses pointer address obfuscation, so it may be okay to expose this. As it is, at least Ubuntu already has CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, so really, there's probably not much difference on exposure.
So, if you drop the "default y", I'm fine with this.
It was maybe stupid, but our userspace started relying on fd comaprison through sys_kcomp. So for better or worse, if you want to run the mesa3d gl/vk stacks, you need this.
That's overstating things somewhat. The vast majority of applications will work fine regardless (as they did before Mesa started using this functionality). Only some special ones will run into issues, because the user-space drivers incorrectly assume two file descriptors reference different descriptions.
Was maybe not the brighest ideas, but since enough distros had this enabled by defaults,
Right, that (and the above) is why I considered it fair game to use. What should I have done instead? (TBH I was surprised that this functionality isn't generally available)
In that spirit, an alternative might be to make KCMP_FILE available unconditionally, and the rest of SYS_kcmp only with CHECKPOINT_RESTORE as before. (Or maybe other parts of SYS_kcmp are generally useful as well?)