On Fri, Feb 11, 2011 at 7:29 PM, Kees Cook kees.cook@canonical.com wrote:

In the continuing effort to avoid kernel addresses leaking to unprivileged users, this patch switches to %pK for /proc/dri/*/vma.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook kees.cook@canonical.com

drivers/gpu/drm/drm_info.c |    9 +++++----  1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_info.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_info.c index 3cdbaf3..be9a9c0 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_info.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_info.c @@ -283,17 +283,18 @@ int drm_vma_info(struct seq_file *m, void *data)  #endif

mutex_lock(&dev->struct_mutex);

• seq_printf(m, "vma use count: %d, high_memory = %p, 0x%08llx\n",

• seq_printf(m, "vma use count: %d, high_memory = %pK, 0x%pK\n",

atomic_read(&dev->vma_count),

• high_memory, (u64)virt_to_phys(high_memory));

• high_memory, (void *)virt_to_phys(high_memory));

list_for_each_entry(pt, &dev->vmalist, head) {                vma = pt->vma;                if (!vma)                        continue;                seq_printf(m,

• "\n%5d 0x%08lx-0x%08lx %c%c%c%c%c%c 0x%08lx000",
• pt->pid, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end,

• "\n%5d 0x%pK-0x%pK %c%c%c%c%c%c 0x%08lx000",
• pt->pid,
• (void *)vma->vm_start, (void *)vma->vm_end,

vma->vm_flags & VM_READ ? 'r' : '-',                           vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE ? 'w' : '-',                           vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC ? 'x' : '-', -- 1.7.2.3

This is a highly reasonable patch. Does 0x%pK show up as 0x0x0 in the log, or just 0x0? Other than that...

Reviewed-by: Corbin Simpson MostAwesomeDude@gmail.com