In nvkm_acr_hsfw_load_bl(), the return value of kmalloc() is directly passed to memcpy(), which could lead to undefined behavior on failure of kmalloc().
Fix this bug by using kmemdup() instead of kmalloc()+memcpy().
This bug was found by a static analyzer.
Builds with 'make allyesconfig' show no new warnings, and our static analyzer no longer warns about this code.
Fixes: 22dcda45a3d1 ("drm/nouveau/acr: implement new subdev to replace "secure boot"") Signed-off-by: Zhou Qingyang zhou1615@umn.edu --- The analysis employs differential checking to identify inconsistent security operations (e.g., checks or kfrees) between two code paths and confirms that the inconsistent operations are not recovered in the current function or the callers, so they constitute bugs.
Note that, as a bug found by static analysis, it can be a false positive or hard to trigger. Multiple researchers have cross-reviewed the bug.
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c index 667fa016496e..a6ea89a5d51a 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c @@ -142,11 +142,12 @@ nvkm_acr_hsfw_load_bl(struct nvkm_acr *acr, const char *name, int ver,
hsfw->imem_size = desc->code_size; hsfw->imem_tag = desc->start_tag; - hsfw->imem = kmalloc(desc->code_size, GFP_KERNEL); - memcpy(hsfw->imem, data + desc->code_off, desc->code_size); - + hsfw->imem = kmemdup(data + desc->code_off, desc->code_size, GFP_KERNEL); nvkm_firmware_put(fw); - return 0; + if (!hsfw->imem) + return -ENOMEM; + else + return 0; }
int
Reviewed-by: Lyude Paul lyude@redhat.com
On Tue, 2022-01-25 at 00:58 +0800, Zhou Qingyang wrote:
In nvkm_acr_hsfw_load_bl(), the return value of kmalloc() is directly passed to memcpy(), which could lead to undefined behavior on failure of kmalloc().
Fix this bug by using kmemdup() instead of kmalloc()+memcpy().
This bug was found by a static analyzer.
Builds with 'make allyesconfig' show no new warnings, and our static analyzer no longer warns about this code.
Fixes: 22dcda45a3d1 ("drm/nouveau/acr: implement new subdev to replace "secure boot"") Signed-off-by: Zhou Qingyang zhou1615@umn.edu
The analysis employs differential checking to identify inconsistent security operations (e.g., checks or kfrees) between two code paths and confirms that the inconsistent operations are not recovered in the current function or the callers, so they constitute bugs.
Note that, as a bug found by static analysis, it can be a false positive or hard to trigger. Multiple researchers have cross-reviewed the bug.
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c index 667fa016496e..a6ea89a5d51a 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c @@ -142,11 +142,12 @@ nvkm_acr_hsfw_load_bl(struct nvkm_acr *acr, const char *name, int ver, hsfw->imem_size = desc->code_size; hsfw->imem_tag = desc->start_tag; - hsfw->imem = kmalloc(desc->code_size, GFP_KERNEL); - memcpy(hsfw->imem, data + desc->code_off, desc->code_size);
+ hsfw->imem = kmemdup(data + desc->code_off, desc->code_size, GFP_KERNEL); nvkm_firmware_put(fw); - return 0; + if (!hsfw->imem) + return -ENOMEM; + else + return 0; } int
On Tue, Jan 25, 2022 at 12:58:55AM +0800, Zhou Qingyang wrote:
In nvkm_acr_hsfw_load_bl(), the return value of kmalloc() is directly passed to memcpy(), which could lead to undefined behavior on failure of kmalloc().
Fix this bug by using kmemdup() instead of kmalloc()+memcpy().
This bug was found by a static analyzer.
Builds with 'make allyesconfig' show no new warnings, and our static analyzer no longer warns about this code.
Fixes: 22dcda45a3d1 ("drm/nouveau/acr: implement new subdev to replace "secure boot"") Signed-off-by: Zhou Qingyang zhou1615@umn.edu
The analysis employs differential checking to identify inconsistent security operations (e.g., checks or kfrees) between two code paths and confirms that the inconsistent operations are not recovered in the current function or the callers, so they constitute bugs.
Note that, as a bug found by static analysis, it can be a false positive or hard to trigger. Multiple researchers have cross-reviewed the bug.
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c index 667fa016496e..a6ea89a5d51a 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c @@ -142,11 +142,12 @@ nvkm_acr_hsfw_load_bl(struct nvkm_acr *acr, const char *name, int ver,
hsfw->imem_size = desc->code_size; hsfw->imem_tag = desc->start_tag;
- hsfw->imem = kmalloc(desc->code_size, GFP_KERNEL);
- memcpy(hsfw->imem, data + desc->code_off, desc->code_size);
- hsfw->imem = kmemdup(data + desc->code_off, desc->code_size, GFP_KERNEL); nvkm_firmware_put(fw);
- return 0;
- if (!hsfw->imem)
return -ENOMEM;- else
return 0;}
int
2.25.1
As stated before, umn.edu is still not allowed to contribute to the Linux kernel. Please work with your administration to resolve this issue.
Sigh-thank you for catching this - I had totally forgot about the umn.edu ban. I pushed this already but I will go ahead and send a revert for this patch. Will cc you on it as well.
On Fri, 2022-01-28 at 11:18 +0100, Greg KH wrote:
On Tue, Jan 25, 2022 at 12:58:55AM +0800, Zhou Qingyang wrote:
In nvkm_acr_hsfw_load_bl(), the return value of kmalloc() is directly passed to memcpy(), which could lead to undefined behavior on failure of kmalloc().
Fix this bug by using kmemdup() instead of kmalloc()+memcpy().
This bug was found by a static analyzer.
Builds with 'make allyesconfig' show no new warnings, and our static analyzer no longer warns about this code.
Fixes: 22dcda45a3d1 ("drm/nouveau/acr: implement new subdev to replace "secure boot"") Signed-off-by: Zhou Qingyang zhou1615@umn.edu
The analysis employs differential checking to identify inconsistent security operations (e.g., checks or kfrees) between two code paths and confirms that the inconsistent operations are not recovered in the current function or the callers, so they constitute bugs.
Note that, as a bug found by static analysis, it can be a false positive or hard to trigger. Multiple researchers have cross-reviewed the bug.
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c index 667fa016496e..a6ea89a5d51a 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c @@ -142,11 +142,12 @@ nvkm_acr_hsfw_load_bl(struct nvkm_acr *acr, const char *name, int ver, hsfw->imem_size = desc->code_size; hsfw->imem_tag = desc->start_tag; - hsfw->imem = kmalloc(desc->code_size, GFP_KERNEL); - memcpy(hsfw->imem, data + desc->code_off, desc->code_size);
+ hsfw->imem = kmemdup(data + desc->code_off, desc->code_size, GFP_KERNEL); nvkm_firmware_put(fw); - return 0; + if (!hsfw->imem) + return -ENOMEM; + else + return 0; } int -- 2.25.1
As stated before, umn.edu is still not allowed to contribute to the Linux kernel. Please work with your administration to resolve this issue.
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 2:20 PM Lyude Paul lyude@redhat.com wrote:
Sigh-thank you for catching this - I had totally forgot about the umn.edu ban. I pushed this already but I will go ahead and send a revert for this patch. Will cc you on it as well.
This seems short-sighted. If the patch is valid I see no reason to not accept it. I'm not trying to downplay the mess umn got into, but as long as the patch is well scrutinized and fixes a valid issue, it should be applied rather than leaving potential bugs in place.
Alex
On Fri, 2022-01-28 at 11:18 +0100, Greg KH wrote:
On Tue, Jan 25, 2022 at 12:58:55AM +0800, Zhou Qingyang wrote:
In nvkm_acr_hsfw_load_bl(), the return value of kmalloc() is directly passed to memcpy(), which could lead to undefined behavior on failure of kmalloc().
Fix this bug by using kmemdup() instead of kmalloc()+memcpy().
This bug was found by a static analyzer.
Builds with 'make allyesconfig' show no new warnings, and our static analyzer no longer warns about this code.
Fixes: 22dcda45a3d1 ("drm/nouveau/acr: implement new subdev to replace "secure boot"") Signed-off-by: Zhou Qingyang zhou1615@umn.edu
The analysis employs differential checking to identify inconsistent security operations (e.g., checks or kfrees) between two code paths and confirms that the inconsistent operations are not recovered in the current function or the callers, so they constitute bugs.
Note that, as a bug found by static analysis, it can be a false positive or hard to trigger. Multiple researchers have cross-reviewed the bug.
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c index 667fa016496e..a6ea89a5d51a 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c @@ -142,11 +142,12 @@ nvkm_acr_hsfw_load_bl(struct nvkm_acr *acr, const char *name, int ver,
hsfw->imem_size = desc->code_size; hsfw->imem_tag = desc->start_tag;
hsfw->imem = kmalloc(desc->code_size, GFP_KERNEL);memcpy(hsfw->imem, data + desc->code_off, desc->code_size);
hsfw->imem = kmemdup(data + desc->code_off, desc->code_size,GFP_KERNEL); nvkm_firmware_put(fw);
return 0;
if (!hsfw->imem)return -ENOMEM;elsereturn 0;}
int
2.25.1
As stated before, umn.edu is still not allowed to contribute to the Linux kernel. Please work with your administration to resolve this issue.
-- Cheers, Lyude Paul (she/her) Software Engineer at Red Hat
On Fri, 2022-01-28 at 14:53 -0500, Alex Deucher wrote:
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 2:20 PM Lyude Paul lyude@redhat.com wrote:
Sigh-thank you for catching this - I had totally forgot about the umn.edu ban. I pushed this already but I will go ahead and send a revert for this patch. Will cc you on it as well.
This seems short-sighted. If the patch is valid I see no reason to not accept it. I'm not trying to downplay the mess umn got into, but as long as the patch is well scrutinized and fixes a valid issue, it should be applied rather than leaving potential bugs in place.
Yeah - I sent a revert for this, but that was mainly just to make sure I didn't cause problems with Linus or something like that. If it's all the same I'd much rather just leave this patch in, as looking at the code the fix seems completely valid.
Alex
On Fri, 2022-01-28 at 11:18 +0100, Greg KH wrote:
On Tue, Jan 25, 2022 at 12:58:55AM +0800, Zhou Qingyang wrote:
In nvkm_acr_hsfw_load_bl(), the return value of kmalloc() is directly passed to memcpy(), which could lead to undefined behavior on failure of kmalloc().
Fix this bug by using kmemdup() instead of kmalloc()+memcpy().
This bug was found by a static analyzer.
Builds with 'make allyesconfig' show no new warnings, and our static analyzer no longer warns about this code.
Fixes: 22dcda45a3d1 ("drm/nouveau/acr: implement new subdev to replace "secure boot"") Signed-off-by: Zhou Qingyang zhou1615@umn.edu
The analysis employs differential checking to identify inconsistent security operations (e.g., checks or kfrees) between two code paths and confirms that the inconsistent operations are not recovered in the current function or the callers, so they constitute bugs.
Note that, as a bug found by static analysis, it can be a false positive or hard to trigger. Multiple researchers have cross-reviewed the bug.
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c index 667fa016496e..a6ea89a5d51a 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c @@ -142,11 +142,12 @@ nvkm_acr_hsfw_load_bl(struct nvkm_acr *acr, const char *name, int ver,
hsfw->imem_size = desc->code_size; hsfw->imem_tag = desc->start_tag; - hsfw->imem = kmalloc(desc->code_size, GFP_KERNEL); - memcpy(hsfw->imem, data + desc->code_off, desc->code_size);
+ hsfw->imem = kmemdup(data + desc->code_off, desc->code_size, GFP_KERNEL); nvkm_firmware_put(fw); - return 0; + if (!hsfw->imem) + return -ENOMEM; + else + return 0; }
int
2.25.1
As stated before, umn.edu is still not allowed to contribute to the Linux kernel. Please work with your administration to resolve this issue.
-- Cheers, Lyude Paul (she/her) Software Engineer at Red Hat
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 02:57:36PM -0500, Lyude Paul wrote:
On Fri, 2022-01-28 at 14:53 -0500, Alex Deucher wrote:
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 2:20 PM Lyude Paul lyude@redhat.com wrote:
Sigh-thank you for catching this - I had totally forgot about the umn.edu ban. I pushed this already but I will go ahead and send a revert for this patch. Will cc you on it as well.
This seems short-sighted. If the patch is valid I see no reason to not accept it. I'm not trying to downplay the mess umn got into, but as long as the patch is well scrutinized and fixes a valid issue, it should be applied rather than leaving potential bugs in place.
Yeah - I sent a revert for this, but that was mainly just to make sure I didn't cause problems with Linus or something like that. If it's all the same I'd much rather just leave this patch in, as looking at the code the fix seems completely valid.
You will not cause any problem at all, don't worry about this, it's not your fault or responsibility. If you think the patch is fine, that's great, no problems. But be extra careful here, treat these developers as you would with any other "they are known to send bad patches so are safe to ignore if I don't want to deal with it" group that many of us maintainers already have to defend against.
thanks,
greg k-h
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 8:54 PM Alex Deucher alexdeucher@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 2:20 PM Lyude Paul lyude@redhat.com wrote:
Sigh-thank you for catching this - I had totally forgot about the umn.edu ban. I pushed this already but I will go ahead and send a revert for this patch. Will cc you on it as well.
This seems short-sighted. If the patch is valid I see no reason to not accept it. I'm not trying to downplay the mess umn got into, but as long as the patch is well scrutinized and fixes a valid issue, it should be applied rather than leaving potential bugs in place.
Alex
Even though knowing that malicious code can be introduced via perfectly fine looking patches, and sometimes one will never spot the problem, this patch isn't all that bad tbh.
So should we reject patches out of "policies" or should we just be extra careful? But not addressing the concerns as Greg pointed out is also kind of a bad move, but also not knowing what the state of resolving this mess is anyway.
On Fri, 2022-01-28 at 11:18 +0100, Greg KH wrote:
On Tue, Jan 25, 2022 at 12:58:55AM +0800, Zhou Qingyang wrote:
In nvkm_acr_hsfw_load_bl(), the return value of kmalloc() is directly passed to memcpy(), which could lead to undefined behavior on failure of kmalloc().
Fix this bug by using kmemdup() instead of kmalloc()+memcpy().
This bug was found by a static analyzer.
Builds with 'make allyesconfig' show no new warnings, and our static analyzer no longer warns about this code.
Fixes: 22dcda45a3d1 ("drm/nouveau/acr: implement new subdev to replace "secure boot"") Signed-off-by: Zhou Qingyang zhou1615@umn.edu
The analysis employs differential checking to identify inconsistent security operations (e.g., checks or kfrees) between two code paths and confirms that the inconsistent operations are not recovered in the current function or the callers, so they constitute bugs.
Note that, as a bug found by static analysis, it can be a false positive or hard to trigger. Multiple researchers have cross-reviewed the bug.
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c index 667fa016496e..a6ea89a5d51a 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c @@ -142,11 +142,12 @@ nvkm_acr_hsfw_load_bl(struct nvkm_acr *acr, const char *name, int ver,
hsfw->imem_size = desc->code_size; hsfw->imem_tag = desc->start_tag;
hsfw->imem = kmalloc(desc->code_size, GFP_KERNEL);memcpy(hsfw->imem, data + desc->code_off, desc->code_size);
hsfw->imem = kmemdup(data + desc->code_off, desc->code_size,GFP_KERNEL); nvkm_firmware_put(fw);
return 0;
if (!hsfw->imem)return -ENOMEM;elsereturn 0;}
int
2.25.1
As stated before, umn.edu is still not allowed to contribute to the Linux kernel. Please work with your administration to resolve this issue.
-- Cheers, Lyude Paul (she/her) Software Engineer at Red Hat
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 2:58 PM Karol Herbst kherbst@redhat.com wrote:
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 8:54 PM Alex Deucher alexdeucher@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 2:20 PM Lyude Paul lyude@redhat.com wrote:
Sigh-thank you for catching this - I had totally forgot about the umn.edu ban. I pushed this already but I will go ahead and send a revert for this patch. Will cc you on it as well.
This seems short-sighted. If the patch is valid I see no reason to not accept it. I'm not trying to downplay the mess umn got into, but as long as the patch is well scrutinized and fixes a valid issue, it should be applied rather than leaving potential bugs in place.
Alex
Even though knowing that malicious code can be introduced via perfectly fine looking patches, and sometimes one will never spot the problem, this patch isn't all that bad tbh.
So should we reject patches out of "policies" or should we just be extra careful? But not addressing the concerns as Greg pointed out is also kind of a bad move, but also not knowing what the state of resolving this mess is anyway.
I think if the umn mess taught us anything, it's the need for more careful scrutiny. But I certainly don't have the time to retype every valid patch if it comes from a umn source. There are also ethical implications to that as well. You didn't actually write the patch.
Alex
On Fri, 2022-01-28 at 11:18 +0100, Greg KH wrote:
On Tue, Jan 25, 2022 at 12:58:55AM +0800, Zhou Qingyang wrote:
In nvkm_acr_hsfw_load_bl(), the return value of kmalloc() is directly passed to memcpy(), which could lead to undefined behavior on failure of kmalloc().
Fix this bug by using kmemdup() instead of kmalloc()+memcpy().
This bug was found by a static analyzer.
Builds with 'make allyesconfig' show no new warnings, and our static analyzer no longer warns about this code.
Fixes: 22dcda45a3d1 ("drm/nouveau/acr: implement new subdev to replace "secure boot"") Signed-off-by: Zhou Qingyang zhou1615@umn.edu
The analysis employs differential checking to identify inconsistent security operations (e.g., checks or kfrees) between two code paths and confirms that the inconsistent operations are not recovered in the current function or the callers, so they constitute bugs.
Note that, as a bug found by static analysis, it can be a false positive or hard to trigger. Multiple researchers have cross-reviewed the bug.
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c index 667fa016496e..a6ea89a5d51a 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c @@ -142,11 +142,12 @@ nvkm_acr_hsfw_load_bl(struct nvkm_acr *acr, const char *name, int ver,
hsfw->imem_size = desc->code_size; hsfw->imem_tag = desc->start_tag;
hsfw->imem = kmalloc(desc->code_size, GFP_KERNEL);memcpy(hsfw->imem, data + desc->code_off, desc->code_size);
hsfw->imem = kmemdup(data + desc->code_off, desc->code_size,GFP_KERNEL); nvkm_firmware_put(fw);
return 0;
if (!hsfw->imem)return -ENOMEM;elsereturn 0;}
int
2.25.1
As stated before, umn.edu is still not allowed to contribute to the Linux kernel. Please work with your administration to resolve this issue.
-- Cheers, Lyude Paul (she/her) Software Engineer at Red Hat
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 08:57:56PM +0100, Karol Herbst wrote:
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 8:54 PM Alex Deucher alexdeucher@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 2:20 PM Lyude Paul lyude@redhat.com wrote:
Sigh-thank you for catching this - I had totally forgot about the umn.edu ban. I pushed this already but I will go ahead and send a revert for this patch. Will cc you on it as well.
This seems short-sighted. If the patch is valid I see no reason to not accept it. I'm not trying to downplay the mess umn got into, but as long as the patch is well scrutinized and fixes a valid issue, it should be applied rather than leaving potential bugs in place.
Alex
Even though knowing that malicious code can be introduced via perfectly fine looking patches, and sometimes one will never spot the problem, this patch isn't all that bad tbh.
So should we reject patches out of "policies" or should we just be extra careful? But not addressing the concerns as Greg pointed out is also kind of a bad move, but also not knowing what the state of resolving this mess is anyway.
If you think the change is correct, and are willing to sign off on it, that's fine for now.
The big issue here is that the umn.edu "researchers" are not folling the very basic and simple proceedures that we worked to set up with them, and have resumed sending buggy patches to the kernel community. If you think this one is not a problem, then feel free to keep it.
As I just now told their administration, it is very difficult to tell malice from incompetence. If this is malice, then we need to defend our community. If this is just incompetence, then the university has to handle that as the contributions are coming in their name, _and_ we also need to defend from that. What we have tried in the past for this group is obviously not working, so we now will need to do something else.
{sigh}
greg k-h
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 1:58 PM Karol Herbst kherbst@redhat.com wrote:
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 8:54 PM Alex Deucher alexdeucher@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 2:20 PM Lyude Paul lyude@redhat.com wrote:
Sigh-thank you for catching this - I had totally forgot about the umn.edu ban. I pushed this already but I will go ahead and send a revert for this patch. Will cc you on it as well.
This seems short-sighted. If the patch is valid I see no reason to not accept it. I'm not trying to downplay the mess umn got into, but as long as the patch is well scrutinized and fixes a valid issue, it should be applied rather than leaving potential bugs in place.
Alex
Even though knowing that malicious code can be introduced via perfectly fine looking patches, and sometimes one will never spot the problem, this patch isn't all that bad tbh.
So should we reject patches out of "policies" or should we just be extra careful? But not addressing the concerns as Greg pointed out is also kind of a bad move, but also not knowing what the state of resolving this mess is anyway.
Seeing some discussion here, I feel I owe you some quick updates on the state. We sent three testing patches in August 2020, which is a serious mistake. We never did that again and will never do that again. All other patches including recent ones were sent to fix real bugs, not to introduce problems. Clearly, although most of the patches are valid, some patches are still not good enough, but it is not about malice. Fixing bugs in Linux isn't an easy task and takes so much effort.
We did not ignore the concerns pointed out by Greg, and have seriously taken some actions. For example, we explained how our static-analysis tool found the bugs, and members in my research group have internally cross-reviewed the found bugs. We sent these patches after contacting Greg---I thought Greg allowed us to send patches, but also requested us to work on the last process with our administration. Unfortunately, the process has been slow during the pandemic, but I hope this can be resolved soon. Of course, before this is resolved, we will not send any more patches.
On Fri, 2022-01-28 at 11:18 +0100, Greg KH wrote:
On Tue, Jan 25, 2022 at 12:58:55AM +0800, Zhou Qingyang wrote:
In nvkm_acr_hsfw_load_bl(), the return value of kmalloc() is directly passed to memcpy(), which could lead to undefined behavior on failure of kmalloc().
Fix this bug by using kmemdup() instead of kmalloc()+memcpy().
This bug was found by a static analyzer.
Builds with 'make allyesconfig' show no new warnings, and our static analyzer no longer warns about this code.
Fixes: 22dcda45a3d1 ("drm/nouveau/acr: implement new subdev to replace "secure boot"") Signed-off-by: Zhou Qingyang zhou1615@umn.edu
The analysis employs differential checking to identify inconsistent security operations (e.g., checks or kfrees) between two code paths and confirms that the inconsistent operations are not recovered in the current function or the callers, so they constitute bugs.
Note that, as a bug found by static analysis, it can be a false positive or hard to trigger. Multiple researchers have cross-reviewed the bug.
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c index 667fa016496e..a6ea89a5d51a 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/acr/hsfw.c @@ -142,11 +142,12 @@ nvkm_acr_hsfw_load_bl(struct nvkm_acr *acr, const char *name, int ver,
hsfw->imem_size = desc->code_size; hsfw->imem_tag = desc->start_tag;
hsfw->imem = kmalloc(desc->code_size, GFP_KERNEL);memcpy(hsfw->imem, data + desc->code_off, desc->code_size);
hsfw->imem = kmemdup(data + desc->code_off, desc->code_size,GFP_KERNEL); nvkm_firmware_put(fw);
return 0;
if (!hsfw->imem)return -ENOMEM;elsereturn 0;}
int
2.25.1
As stated before, umn.edu is still not allowed to contribute to the Linux kernel. Please work with your administration to resolve this issue.
-- Cheers, Lyude Paul (she/her) Software Engineer at Red Hat
-- Kangjie Lu Assistant Professor Department of Computer Science and Engineering University of Minnesota https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~kjlu
On Sat, Jan 29, 2022 at 08:18:55AM -0600, Kangjie Lu wrote:
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 1:58 PM Karol Herbst kherbst@redhat.com wrote:
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 8:54 PM Alex Deucher alexdeucher@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 2:20 PM Lyude Paul lyude@redhat.com wrote:
Sigh-thank you for catching this - I had totally forgot about the umn.edu ban. I pushed this already but I will go ahead and send a revert for this patch. Will cc you on it as well.
This seems short-sighted. If the patch is valid I see no reason to not accept it. I'm not trying to downplay the mess umn got into, but as long as the patch is well scrutinized and fixes a valid issue, it should be applied rather than leaving potential bugs in place.
Alex
Even though knowing that malicious code can be introduced via perfectly fine looking patches, and sometimes one will never spot the problem, this patch isn't all that bad tbh.
So should we reject patches out of "policies" or should we just be extra careful? But not addressing the concerns as Greg pointed out is also kind of a bad move, but also not knowing what the state of resolving this mess is anyway.
Seeing some discussion here, I feel I owe you some quick updates on the state. We sent three testing patches in August 2020, which is a serious mistake. We never did that again and will never do that again. All other patches including recent ones were sent to fix real bugs, not to introduce problems. Clearly, although most of the patches are valid, some patches are still not good enough, but it is not about malice. Fixing bugs in Linux isn't an easy task and takes so much effort.
We did not ignore the concerns pointed out by Greg, and have seriously taken some actions. For example, we explained how our static-analysis tool found the bugs, and members in my research group have internally cross-reviewed the found bugs. We sent these patches after contacting Greg---I thought Greg allowed us to send patches, but also requested us to work on the last process with our administration.
I do not recall saying anything like this at all.
On January 4, I wrote to you and your coworkers on the mailing list message https://lore.kernel.org/r/YdQfCGf8qr5zZJef@kroah.com by saying:
Note that your university is still in many kernel maintainer's ignore-list (myself included, I dug this up as I saw Fei's response.) Please work with your administration and the process that is currently happening in order to give you all the needed training so you will not keep causing these types of basic errors that keep your patches from being accepted.
*plonk*
And then later in a private email to you on January 5 where you emailed Kees and me to try to see if you were allowed to start sending patches again, I said:
A kernel developer with lots of experience has already offered to work with your university. Hopefully that process has already started, if not, I suggest contacting your administration as they should know who this is.
and then I closed with:
Right now you all are still on my "ignore email" lists for patches.
The patches recently submitted have been shown to be incomplete and in some places, completely wrong. I have contacted your administration about this issue because they asked to know if there were any problems in the future at our last discussion. In that response today, I wrote:
I know that incompetence can often times be hard to distinguish from malice, but given the track-record here, we are now going to have to treat this as malice. If it is just incompetence, well, that's something that your organization needs to overcome.
Either way, this is not something that the Linux kernel community should be forced to endure.
So to be explicit, so you do not misunderstand me somehow:
No more patches from umn.edu should be accepted into the Linux kernel until further public notice. They should be considered a "bad actor" given their prior history of submissions and lack of complying with the kernel community's prior requirements to them.
Is this understood?
greg k-h
Hi,Greg,
On Sat, Jan 29, 2022 at 8:47 AM Greg KH gregkh@linuxfoundation.org wrote:
On Sat, Jan 29, 2022 at 08:18:55AM -0600, Kangjie Lu wrote:
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 1:58 PM Karol Herbst kherbst@redhat.com wrote:
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 8:54 PM Alex Deucher alexdeucher@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 2:20 PM Lyude Paul lyude@redhat.com wrote:
Sigh-thank you for catching this - I had totally forgot about the umn.edu ban. I pushed this already but I will go ahead and send a revert for this patch. Will cc you on it as well.
This seems short-sighted. If the patch is valid I see no reason to not accept it. I'm not trying to downplay the mess umn got into, but as long as the patch is well scrutinized and fixes a valid issue, it should be applied rather than leaving potential bugs in place.
Alex
Even though knowing that malicious code can be introduced via perfectly fine looking patches, and sometimes one will never spot the problem, this patch isn't all that bad tbh.
So should we reject patches out of "policies" or should we just be extra careful? But not addressing the concerns as Greg pointed out is also kind of a bad move, but also not knowing what the state of resolving this mess is anyway.
Seeing some discussion here, I feel I owe you some quick updates on the state. We sent three testing patches in August 2020, which is a serious mistake. We never did that again and will never do that again. All other patches including recent ones were sent to fix real bugs, not to introduce problems. Clearly, although most of the patches are valid, some patches are still not good enough, but it is not about malice. Fixing bugs in Linux isn't an easy task and takes so much effort.
We did not ignore the concerns pointed out by Greg, and have seriously taken some actions. For example, we explained how our static-analysis tool found the bugs, and members in my research group have internally cross-reviewed the found bugs. We sent these patches after contacting Greg---I thought Greg allowed us to send patches, but also requested us to work on the last process with our administration.
I do not recall saying anything like this at all.
I was referring to an email back to 11/13/2021 where you said "some memory allocation checks are not ever going to be "resolved" as they are not "real world" issues. So be aware of that when proposing patches for these issues."
I optimistically interpreted this as, "you can still submit patches, but I will personally ignore them". This turns out to be a misunderstanding. I am sorry for that.
On January 4, I wrote to you and your coworkers on the mailing list message https://lore.kernel.org/r/YdQfCGf8qr5zZJef@kroah.com by saying:
Note that your university is still in many kernel maintainer's ignore-list (myself included, I dug this up as I saw Fei's response.) Please work with your administration and the process that is currently happening in order to give you all the needed training so you will not keep causing these types of basic errors that keep your patches from being accepted. *plonk*And then later in a private email to you on January 5 where you emailed Kees and me to try to see if you were allowed to start sending patches again, I said:
A kernel developer with lots of experience has already offered to work with your university. Hopefully that process has already started, if not, I suggest contacting your administration as they should know who this is.and then I closed with:
Right now you all are still on my "ignore email" lists for patches.The patches recently submitted have been shown to be incomplete and in some places, completely wrong. I have contacted your administration about this issue because they asked to know if there were any problems in the future at our last discussion. In that response today, I wrote:
I know that incompetence can often times be hard to distinguish from malice, but given the track-record here, we are now going to have to treat this as malice. If it is just incompetence, well, that's something that your organization needs to overcome. Either way, this is not something that the Linux kernel community should be forced to endure.So to be explicit, so you do not misunderstand me somehow:
No more patches from umn.edu should be accepted into the Linux kernel until further public notice.
This is clear to me.
They should be considered a "bad actor" given their prior history of submissions and lack of complying with the kernel community's prior requirements to them.
I am sorry for the delay of the last process which is unfortunately not under the control of the researchers. According to our administration, the process has started and is moving forward. I hope that can be done soon.
Thanks.
Is this understood?
greg k-h
On Sat, Jan 29, 2022 at 09:19:18AM -0600, Kangjie Lu wrote:
So to be explicit, so you do not misunderstand me somehow:
No more patches from umn.edu should be accepted into the Linux kernel until further public notice.This is clear to me.
They should be considered a "bad actor" given their prior history of submissions and lack of complying with the kernel community's prior requirements to them.
I am sorry for the delay of the last process which is unfortunately not under the control of the researchers. According to our administration, the process has started and is moving forward. I hope that can be done soon.
Given that our previously agreed-upon requirements were not met, I do not think that finally meeting these requirements when caught that you were not following them is going to be acceptable to allow your organization to return to the kernel community.
Your people have shown bad-faith toward us too many times, and we have wasted too much of our own time and energy on this for absolutely no benefit at all, except as an example to point others at and say "do not be like them."
greg k-h
dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
-
Alex Deucher -
Greg KH -
Kangjie Lu -
Karol Herbst -
Lyude Paul -
Zhou Qingyang